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In the Supreme .Court
of the State of Utah
MODESTA MARIE BER'L'AGNOLI,
ANSI;~L H. PRA'L'T and RHODA
R. P H A 'l' r_t_' , h i s w i f e, L. M.
SPHOlJL and BELVA SPHOUL,
his wife, C. A. CHIDEt:;rrER an(l
.n~SNU~ R CHJDES'l'l,~R, his wife,
Pctit,ioners,
-vs.HOX CLAHI£NCE _K BAKEH,
liOK. .JOSI 1~PH G. .JEPPSON,
lLO~. ROALD A. HOGENSON",
110~. .J. ALLA:t'\ CROCKET'l',
HON. RAY VAN COT'L', .JR., ancl
liON. A. H. ELLE'l'T, in their
eapaeity as ,Judges of the District
Court of Uw 'l'hinl .Judieial Distrid of tlw State of Utah, in and
i'or Salt Lake County, and 'l'HI'~
BOARD OF Ji~DUCA'l'ION OF'
S.\L'l' LAKE~ CT'I'Y, a public eorporation,
llespondcnts.
BHIKF' OF

Ca:,;e No.

7408

P"B~TI'l'IONERS

1 fiS'l'OHY OF PROCEEDINGS
1. 'L'he respondent, Board of Education ol' Salt
Lake City (hereinafter designated "SCHOOL BOARD")
is a pnhlie corporation organi7.ed and Pxisting uwln
and hy virtue of thP laws of th1~ State of Utah. 'l'lw
rPsptmtlents, Hon. Clarence E. Baker, Hon .•J oseplt 0.
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.Jepp::;oll, Hem. Roald A. Hoge11::;on, lion .•J. Allan Croekett, lion. Ra? \Tan Cott, .Jr., and Hon. A. H. Ellett
(hereinafter eollectivt~ly designatPd "D l S 'l' RIC T
COURT") wen~ at all timns hen•inaftPr lllPntionc~d and
are now regularly eleeted, qualific~d and ac·ting judg(';.;
of the District Court of the 'rhird .Tudic·ial J)i;.;trid of
the State o!' Utah, in and for Salt l . ah County.
'l'he petitimwr, 1\l odesta 11m·ie Hc>rtagnoli, JS thn
principal owner in fee simple, and thu other rwtitionen;
elaim an interest (sueh intPrPst hc•ing lH·n•inaftpr deserihed) in tlw following deserihed trac·t and ]Hll'Cf)l or
land situate in Salt Lake County, Utah:
Commcmeing at the Southeast corner of Lot ~.
Block 14, Five Acre Plat "C", Big Field Survey,
and running thence North 89 deg. 49' 10" \Ve>:~t
762.24 feet; thence North 0 deg. 03' 32" \Vest
578.74 feet; thence South 89 deg. 42' 16" Bast
628.35 feet; thenee South 88 deg. 2G' ()(j" Eas~
132.45 feet; thence South 0- cleg·. 12' 32" J<';ast
57 4.29 feet to point of beginning.
2. On September 7, l 949, the School Board eommeneed an adion known a])(l designated as Case Nu.
87,004 (hereinafter designated "CONDI~MNATION
ACTION", in the Distriet Court of the Third Judicial
Distriet of the State of Utah in and for Salt Lake County,
agaim;t the petiti01wrs and Zions Savinf,?;s Bank & Trn..;t
Company, a corporation of Utah, by filing with the Clerk
of said Court its vc>rific>d eornplaint (petitioners' exhibit
"2") praying for judgment of said Court whereby the
above described tract and parcel of land would be condemned for the> nse and benefit of said Sehool Board.
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Nummom; was duly Sl~rvPd upon eaeh and all ol' ilw said
petition('l'S and the said L;ions Savings Bank & 'Pnut
Compm1~·. Within the time allow<_•d L.r law, the petitioners appeared in said action by counsel, and serv<~d and
filed their g<·neral and special denmner (Peti tiouers'
Exhihii "i~") to the complaint in said adion, on the following grotnHls:
"1. 'l'hat the said complaint does not allege
!'ads ~;uf'ficient to eom;titntt> a cause of action
against these d<>mmTing d<d'Pn<lants, or any of
tlwm.
' ' ·J
'i hat t!H' said complaint is uncertain Ill
III<> foll<ming n~speets and particulars:
(a) 'l'ha t ihe said complaint does not allPg<:~ m· state hy proper teehnical and legal
d<·:·:eription th(~ part of the real property inyo]n•d in this action and deserihed in paragrapll ~ thPrPol', whil'h is lo<·atPd within tht~
nmni(~ipallimits of Salt LakP City Corporation,
and the part ihereol' which is loeated without
the munieipal limits of said Ralt Lake City and
\':ithin the limits of' Salt Lake County, Utah.
(h) That the said eomplaint does not allege
or state tlw type and natnre of tlH• sehool house
proposed to he en'cted upon thP said land described in paragraph 2 tht~reof, distinguishing
between high sehool, junior high sehool, or elemental')' sl'hool use.
(c) '!'hat the said eomplaint does not allege
or state the number of students that will b'~
aceommodatPd in said proposed school house to
b(~ erPcted upon saicl land dt•serilwd in paragrapll ~ then~of.

(d) That the said eomplaint d<ws not allege
or stnte the partienlar anrl specific intended use

.,
c)

o[ saiu real property by the plaiutiff with rc:,;ped to the loeation of the proposed school
house thereon, the part thereof which it is
proposed to use for play ground and recreational area in connection \Yi th said schoiJl
house, and the part thereof which will not be
snhjected to use for thr aforpsaid purposes.
"3. 'l'hat the said eomplaint is ambiguous for
the reasons set forth and alleged in :,;nil-paragraphs (a), (b), (c), all<l (d) of paragraph 2
hereof."
~ r L'altaneously with the service and filing of said dei llitl't'er, said petitioners served and filed thPir notice o1
iJlhe~ttion (petitioners' Exhibit "4") to movE~ the Court
l'ur an order requiring said School Board to make ih
t'<):' plaint in sai<l <·ondemnation action more dnJiuit<~ and
~"n.aill in tlte following parii<~nlar:-::

"1. 'J1hat tltn plaintiff lw n~quired' to allPJ.\·r·
al\(1 ::;tate in its eomplaint by proper tPehnical and
legal desniption the part of the real property iHvolv<·<l in this adion and descrilwd in paragraph
2 of its eomJJlaint which is loeated within tllt•
mnnieipal limits of Salt Lak<~ City Corporation,
all([ tlw part tlwreof "'ltieh is Joeatnd without tltt'
mtmieipallimits of sai<l Salt Lalw City and witlti:1
thP limit:,; of Salt Lake County, Utah.
"2. 'J'hat tlw plaintiff he reqni red to all e·~·<~
and :-tatn in it:- eomplaint tlw typ<~ an<l natun~ o'i'
t.lw s<~ltool bouse proposPd to be <~l'<'d<'d upon tltt~
sai<l land desnilw<l in paragraph 2 of plainti f'f':.:
<~ompJaint, <li~.:ting-ui:-hing- \\'hdher tlH· sai<l :-eltool
house will be usc>d for high school purpo:ws,
junior high seltool purpo:-<•s, or el<•.ntPntary sel10ol
pnrposPs.
"::L '!'hat iiH• plainti f'f be n~qnin•d to alleg'J
aud state in its eomp1aint th<~ nmuhr>r of stn<]Pnts
1

"!

that will be accommodated in ~aid proposed school
homw to be en~cte<l upon said land described in
paragraph 2 of plaintiff's complaint.
"4. rrhat the plaintiff he required to alleg~
and state in its complaint the particular and ::;peeific intended n::;<~ of said real property by the
11laintiff with resrwct to th0 location of the prqpo~Pd ::;ehool hous<~ thereon, the part thereof'
whit·h it i~ propose<l to u::;e for play ground and
rPnE>ational arPa in eonlledion with said school
house, and the part th0reof whieh will not he subjedt>cl to use for tlw afor<->said purposes."
On the fith day of OetohE>r, 1949, the said School
Boanl ~<'rverl upon tlw petitioners and filed in said
Court and cam;p its motion (pditioners' Exhibit "6")
for an onler 11nder Seetion 104-61-5 Utah Code 1943
authorizing entry upon said real property for the purpose ol' making examinations, ::;urv0ys and maps thereof.
of ( jourt and counsel, on the 7ttl
da~· of (ktolwr, 1 D49, the said motion of tht> School
Boanl (p<>titionC'rs' Exhibit "6") came on for argument,
pm~uant to notiee (]wtitionpr~' Exhibit "8"), befor~
the Honorahh~ .J. Allan Crockett, a JndgP of said Di;:;trid Court. lTpon stipulation of counsel, ma<l<~ in opeH
<·ourt, tht> al'on•suid denmrr<'r and motion of petitimH•r,
(pt'titimwr~' F~xhihits ":3" nnd "4") Wf~n~ argued sinmltanPon~l~- witl1 th<~ argnmPnt ol' the motion or said
N<"hool Bonnl (pPtitionPrs' 11 ~xhihit "G"). Upon ront•lnsion ol' said argument, the matters were ~uhmitted ill
the Court, and tlwn•arter the saicl Court, aet"ing hy aml
tl1rough ~aid Honorable J. Allan Croekett, a .Tn<lgP
tlwr0of, macl£', <>ntcr£'<1 and filed its minute or<lPrs oYeril.

B~- t•on~C'nt

ruling the general and :,;peeial demUJTPI' of the petitioners
(petitioner:,.;' ~xhibit ":1"), denying the i'aid petitioner:,.;'
motion for an order ( prtitioners' ~xhibi t "4 ") rcq ni ring the said School Board to make it:,.; eomplaint moru
definite and certain, and granting the motion of sai,J
School Board for entry upon the above described real
property for purposes of making exa!llinations, i'nrvey..;;
and maps. '!,hereafter, on the 10th day of Octoher, 194~),
the said Honorable .T. Allan Croekett, in his capacity as
,J ndge afore~mid, signc,d and filed a file order (plaintiffs'
ljJxhibit "11 ") affirming and including the matters d~::
termined hy his aforesaid minute orderf.>.

4. On the 13th day of Oetober, 1949, the petitioners
filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the Sta~e
of Utah their petition praying for an alternative writ
of Prol!ihition dire(~ted to the Distrid Court and the
Ndwol Board. lTpon consideration of said petition by
tlw llonorahle Chi(~f .Justiee of the Supreme Court, it
was ordPrt>d that :,.;aid alternativ(• writ uf Prohibition
i:,;KliP, and under da!e of OdobPr 1:1, 1949, the same wa:,.;
i:--:Klll'd by tiH~ ClPrk of :,.;aid Snpremn ConrL By :,.;aid
writ thP :,.;aid Disiri(~t Court and Uw judges thereof
1n~n· (~ommanded to refrain from any fn rtlwr proet>eding:,.; ill :,.;ai(l ('O!ldPmllaiion adi()]}' im;ofar UK it {Wrtain:-;
to real propert~· loeatPd without th<' munieipal limits of
Salt Lake Cit~:. nntil furtfw1· ord<'r ol' Haid NuprenH~
Court. fSeiTi<'e or thP \Hit was mad(' upon the Disti·ict
Court and the School Board on the 14th day of Octolwr,
1949. rl'he rt'tnrn day of said writ \\'as OetolH~r :M, 194D,
at 10:00 o 'eloek A.l\f. In I'C'KJlOll~P to ;-;:aid alh~rnativ(~

writ of Prohibition, respondents have filed their (a)
demurrer to the petition, (b) motion to quash tlle said
alternative writ, and (c) answer to said petition. By
stipulation of counsel signed and filed on October 21,
1949, a map of Salt Lake City, cPrtified hy Vv. D. Beer:-:,
City lj~ngineer (hereinafter designat0d "School Hoard
~I ap ") was made part of the n~cord in said aetion. B ;·
said stipulation also there was made part of the record,
~mbject to tlw petitioners' objection that the same a1~
immaterial, (a) map of Salt Lake City showing junior
high school zones, (b) drawing entitled ''Map of South<'a::;tern Salt Lake City" showing the homes immediai<>l~
adjaeent to proposed junior high school ::;ite, and (e)
drawing entitled "Pupil Distribution in Sonth0ast<·rn
Salt Lalw City as p£'r 1948 S<·hool CE>nsn:-;".
STA'l'El\JEN1' OF ]'ACTS
1. The tract and parcel of land hereinbefore particularly described is situate at the Northeast corner of
the intersection of South 19th East Street and 17th
South Street. The area is shown in hatched lines on
the Sehool Board Map, and is also delineated npon
petitioners' F~xhi hit "1 ", being an official plat of the
South half of Block 14, J1'ive Aere Plat "C", Big Field
Survey, prepared by the County Recorder of Salt Lakt>
County, Utah. This parcel of land contains 10.12 acres,
ancl is situate partly within and partly without the mnnicipallimits of Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation
of tlw first elas:-; of the State of Fiah. Ac<~onling to thl'
rpenrcl:-; in the offi<·<• ol' thP ('onn(~· R<•eonkr ol' Salt

Lake County, Utah, 6.07 acres of said land are situat2
without the municipal limits of said Salt Lake City and
within Salt Lake County, Utah and also within the limits
of Granite School District, a public corporation of the
State of Utah, located in said County. Also according
to the records in the office of the County Recorder of
Salt Lake County, Utah, approximately 4.05 acres of
said land are situate within the municipal limits of said
Salt Lake City. According to the claim of the respondents, the total area of the land involved is 10.1 acre~,
with 4.51 acres being located within the municipal limit::;
of Salt Lake City and 5.59 acres being located without
the municipal limits of Salt Lake City. The part of the
land without the municipal limits of Salt Lake City and
the part of the land within the municipal limits of Salt
Lake City are contiguous and adjacent, and together
form one parcel of land, as hereinabove particularly described. The area delineated on the School Board map
in yellow, outlined in red, constitutes territory within
Salt Lake County and also within Granite School District. The exterior municipal boundary lines of Salt
Lake City Corporation are delineated on said map in
red.
2. The petitioner, Modesta Marie Bertagnoli, is the
principal owner in fee simple of the tract and parcel of
land sought to he condemned. The interests of petitioners
Ansel H. Pratt and Rhoda R. Pratt, his wife, L. :M.
Sproul and Belva Sproul, his wife, and C. A. Chidester,
and Jessie R. Chidester, hi::; wifP, ari::;e through conflict
of houwlary aml fL•Iwe lin(~S oi" the tract and parcel of
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land above described with adjoining :and adjacent areas
owned by these latter petitioners. '!'hey vYere joined as
parties defendant in the condemnation action, in order
to eliminate certain clouds on and conflicts in title.

:3. The ~e!Jool Board seeks to exercise its right of
eminPnt <lolllain and to eondemn the land of the petitioners in order to secure an area upon which to construct, operate, and maintain a ;junior high school whieh
will form part of the school system operated by tlw
Rchool Board under the authority conferred upon it by
tlw Constitution and statutes of tlw State of Utah.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
''Private property shall not be taken or
<lamaged for public use without just compensa1 ion."
(Artitle I, SPction 22, Constitution of

Utah.,)
"In cities of the first and second class, the
public school system shall be controlled by the
Board of Education of such cities, separate and
apart from the counties in which said cities are
located." (Article X, Section 6, Constitution of

Utah.)
STATUTORY REFERENCES
''Subject to the provisions of this chapter,
the right of eminent domain may be exercised in
h<>half of the following public uses: * '~ * (3)
Public buildings and grounds for the use of any
(~onnty, city, or incorporated town or board of
0dncation; '~ * *. (Section 104-61-1, Utah Code
1.943.)

"'rhe Publie School System in cities of the
first and seeond elass shall be controlled by the

hoard of edueation of ~lwh <'ltlPs, separate and
apart from trw eounties in which tlw <~ities are
loeated, and all s<·hool proJwrty therein sllall be
under the <liredion awl control of the City Board
of I•:chwation." (Section 75-9-5 Utah Code 1.943.)
''Cities and sehool districts may eon tract and
cooperate with one another ill matten; affecting
the h<'alth, Wl~lfare and convenienct) of the inhabitants within tlwir respective 1Prritorial limits;
and citil~S may disburse pnblie funds ill aid of
the sehool dish·icts within the limits of their respective ciii<~~." (Section 75-9-21 Utah Code 1.943,
approved itfarcli 14, i949.)
"Hoanl~ of Education of Utah school di,·)tricts may participate in the joint construetion
or orwration, or both, of a school attl'ndPd b:y
ehildren within the district and ehildren rl'siding
in adjoining districts, fdther within or ont~ide the~
Ntat<', prov id(•d, (ll<• agT('ClllPll t lwt we<'ll the hoards
of' edueation of all participating· districts, signed
hy Ow residents (sie,) of the n~~rwetive hoards,
is filed with tlw Rtat<> Board of l~uucation." (Sectimi 76-11-:Jf!' Utah eode 194.'1, apprm:erl Jlrfarch
1.9, 1.949.)
"En~ry hoanl ol' <·<hwation shall hav<' pow<'r
and authority to pureha~e and ::-;ell ~choolhoni'<'
sites and impro\"PilH'nt~ thereon, to construct and
t'r<'<'L ~<·hool lmilding~ and to l"urni~h the sam<·. to
<'~iahl i::-;lt,
1oeate an<] maintain kind<'rga rtcn
~dwol~, <·omnwn sehools consisting of prirnar/
and grammar grades, high ~chool~ aml indu~t rial
or manual training school~, to <>~tabli~h and Sllllport ~ehool librariPs, to pureha~e, exchang<~, repair and improvf~ high sdwol apparatus, hook:-;,
fnrnitun•, fixtm·<·~ and all othcr school :mpplie:::.
* * * and may adopt by-laws and rules for its
<1\VIl proet•<hll'P and mak<' and <mforce all neodl'ul
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rules and regulations for the control and management of the public schools of the district."
(Section 75-11-20 Utah Code 1943.)
"The board of education of every school district shall be a body corporate under the namn
of the 'Board of Education of-------------------- School
Distrid or '------------------------ City' as the case may be
(inserting the proper name), and shall have an
official seal conformable to such name, which
shall be used by its Clerk in the authentication
of all matters requiring- it. Said boards in the
11amC' aforesaid may sue ,and he sued, and may
take, hold, lt>a::-;e, :,;~11 and convey real and personal property as th(~ interests of the schools may
require." (Section 76-Y-8 Utah Code 1943.)
"When all the territory of a school district
shall become annexed to a city of the first or
second class by the extension of the boundaries
of the city, all the school property, including
moneys on hand and due to such district, together
~with all records and papers belonging to such
district, shall be transferred to and title shall
vest in the board of education of such city, and
such board of education shall assume and be held
responsible for the legitimate floating and bonded
indebtedness of such annexed district." (Section
'?!S-9-10 Utah Code 1943.}
For apportionment of bonded indebtedness,
when by the extension of the limits of any city
of the first or second class into an adjacent
school district, see Section 75-9-11.
"Before property can be taken it must appear:
(1) that the use to which it is to be applied is
a use authorized by law;
\'2.) that the taking is necc::;sary to such use;

and,
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(3) if alrl•ady appropriated tu 1-lullle public
use, that the public use to which it is to be applied
is a more necessary public use." (Section 1046'1-4 Utah Code 1943.}
"In all cases where land is n~quired for pu!JIic use, Uw person, or his agent, in charge of snch
use may survey and locatP tlw same; lmi it nnL.;t
he loeated in the manner which will he most eompatible with the f.!)"Patest pnhlie g-ood and Ute least
privatn injur~-, and subjeet to the provisions ol'
this ehapter. Tlw person, or hi:,; agent, in ehar~·e
of ;;.;m~h publie u:,;e may enter upon the land and
malw examinations, survl~ys and maps th<>n•oi',
and such l~ntry shall constitut<\ no eausc of aetion in favor of tlw owners of the lands, except
l'or injuries resulting from negligenee, wantonIIPSS or malieP."
(Sedion 104-6'1-5 Utah Code
l.'M.'J.)

"Tlw plaintiff" mn:· moYP thP eourt or a judgl~
lh<•n•ol', at any tim<~ aftpr the eornm<·n<·emeat ol"
suit, on notiee to the d<:d\mdant, it' he is a n>sident
of the state, or has appeared by attornPy in thE\
aetion, othPrwis<\ hy :·wrving a notice din\cted to
him on the clerk of the eourt, for an order per-mitting the plaintiff to occup~c the prPmis<•-.:
sought to be CondC-'IllilPd flPII<ling tfw a<~tioll, and
in do sneh work thl'reon as may he required for
the easement sought according to its nature. rl'h0
eonrt or a judge thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwi:,;e of the value of the premises
sought to be condernn<~d and of the damages whieh
will acerue from the condemnation, and of tlJt>
n~asons for requiring a speedy occupation, and
shall grant or refuse the motion according to the
r>quity of the ca!'le and the relativ<.~ damages which
may accrue to the parties. If the motion is
gran ted, the court o I' judgy shall n•quirc th1•

Jllaintiff to execute and file in court a bond to
the defen(lant with sureties to be approved by
the court or judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by
the court or judge, not less than double the valu(~
of the pre.mises sought to be condemned and the
damage:,; whieh will ensue from con(lemnation, as
the same may appear to the co'lut or judge on
the hearing, and eonditioned to pay the adjudged
valu<~ of the premises and all damages in case
t hP THO pert~- is eondonuwd, and to pay all damages arising from occupation before judgment in
case the premises are not condemned, and all
costs adjudged to the defendant in the action.
The sureties shall justify before the court or
jndge after a reasonable notice to the defendant
of the time and place of justification. The amounts
fi.xed shall be for the purposes of the motion only,
and shall not be admissable in evidence on final
hearing. The court or judge may also, pending
the action, restrain the defondant from hindering or interfering with the occupation of the
premises and the doing thereon of the work re(£Uired for the easement." (Section 104-61-_10
Utah Carie 1.943.)

S'f' A'I'~J\lEN'P OF ARGUMEN'f'S
I.
THE SCHOOL BOARD IS A PUBLIC MUNICIPAL CORPORATION CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION OP
THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE LEGISLATURE, POSSESSING ONLY SUCH POWERS AS ARE EXPRESSLY
CONFERRED UPON IT AND SUCH IMPLIED POWERS
AS ARE NECESSARY TO EXECUTE AND CARRY INTO
EFFECT ITS EXPRESS POWERS.

The legal status of the Board of JiJdueation of Salt
Lake City ha:,; been fully acljuclicated by thE~ State
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Supreme Court. Quotations from the Court's decisions
are all that is necessary to elucidate the legal statu:-;
of the School Board.
1.
''' '' * '' 'rhe Board of J£ducation is invested with thf) exclusive control of and responsibility for the public school system, independent
of the county government." * * '~ (Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. Bergan, et al, 62 Dtah
162, 217 Pac. 1112.)
2. ''A board of education is a legal entity
created by statute. For the purpose of administering the affairs n~lating to Rchools within a
designated area, certain limited powers are conferred upon boards of education. 'l'hese powers
are exercised for the welfare and in the intereo'lt
of the people within the designated area. In Utah
there an) three types or classPs of school districts.
'1\vo of tlw classt•s are ereated by the Constitution insol"ar as tlw tPrritoria1 area is <lm;ignated,
eomprising eiiies of the firtlt and of the second
elass. Constitution of the State or Utah, Article
X, Sedion fi. 'rhe third type of elass has been
denominated 'county sdwol <listricts of the first
elass', Laws o!' l 1tal1 1~JOG, Chapter 107, sometimes refened to as '<~<msoli<lated school disb·iets' and now referred to as '<~<mnty school districts'." (Hansen v. Board of Rdttcation, _____ _
·Utah ______ , llG Pac. 2d 9:)G.)
i3. '"rhe powers of the hoard of edneation ar0
statutory, since the h)gislatnre may authorize the
governing authoriti<)S of :owhool distriets, as the
state's agents, to do anything not prohibited by
the Constitution '~ * '. 'l'he board of education,
being a ereation of the legislature, has only such
powers as are expressly <~onferred upon it and
sueh impli.P<l pow(~J·s as an~ neePssary to execute
14

and earry into dfect its express powers." (Beard
1'. Hoard of Education, Rl Utah Gl, 16 Pac. 2d
~)00-903.)

4. '' ' * ''' A board of edueation 1s a public
municipal ('Orporation." (Chamberlain v. Watter.-.,., 10 Utah 298, ;n Pae. 5GG.)
5. Cf:

(Carbon County v. Oarhon County

Hi,qh School !Jistrict, 4fi Utah 147, 143 Pac. 220.)
JI.
THE SCHOOL BOARD IS AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN ONLY WITHIN
THE MUNICIPAL LIMITS OF SALT LAKE CITY.
'rhe pmn~r of eminc~nt domain has its inception ht
tlw so\·en~ignity of the state. It is a power inherent in
the statP and essential to ih; existenc·e. It i:,.; based on
the law of 1weessity. It is not dependent for its existem··~
upon a specific grant in the Constitution of the state.

The provision in the Utah State Constitution relating
to the taking of property for the public use (Article 1,
SPetion 22) does not by implication grant the power of
eminent domain to the government of the state, but
limits a power which would otherwise be limitless.
( 18 A rn. Jur., Sent ion 7, lJ. (j.'J!J.) 'rhe right to authorizt~
the exerc~ise of this po\\'er helongs exclusively to tlw
legislatun~. 'L'he legislature call:-: the power into operation l'rom tltP depths of' the state'::; sovereignty. No
rnunii'ipal e.orporation or other sllhdivision of the stat•~
lws an)r right to <~xereise thP power ol' eminPnt domain
\\'itltont sp<•eifi<~ authority front th<~ legislatUJ'('. 1t nm-;t
follow that tlw IPgislature ea11 <~onhol and limit the

<'X!'n·is<' ol' tl1is p<mer vvhen <l<>legat<>d hy it. (18 Am.
Jf)

Jur., Sec. D, p. 637.) Statutes granting the power of
eminent domain to agencies or units of the state are in
contravention of the common rights of persons, and
should receive a strict construction. (Lewis on Eminent
Domain, 3rd Edition, Vol. 1, p. 708, Sec. 388; ()ooley on
Constitutional Limitation::;, 8th Edition, Vol. :J, p. 1112.)
'l'he power of eminent domain, when delegah•d by the
state to a political unit or agency, will be strictly construed against the agency or unit receiving the grant
of power. (Peavey-Wilson Lumber Company v. Brevard
()ounty, 31 So. (Fla.) 2d 483; 172 A.L.R. 168; Wise v.
Y a.zoo City, 90 Miss. 507, 51 So. 453, 26 L.R.A. ( NS) 1130.)
Beyonu doubt the School Board has received from
the legislature of the State of Utah a grant of the power
of eminent domain for the purpose of securing lands
necessary for the construction and maintenance of school
buildings and grounds. 'l'he statute granting this power
makes no specific provision for the exercise of same by
the School Board upon lands without and beyond the
limits of the School Board's jurisdiction. It is therefore the contention of the petitioners that the School
Board cannot exercise this power of eminent domain
upon land located without the municipal limits of said
city. Tho School Board, in seeking to obtain 6.07 acres
of land admittedly without the limits of Salt Lake City
and within the limits of Granite School District, is actmg without either specific or implied authority.
The petitioners submit the following quotations
from recognized authorities to sustain tltt>ir position:
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1. '' 'l1he primary purpose of a municipal corporatiou is to eontribute to\vard the ~welfare,
health, happiness and public interest of the inhabitants of such corporation, and not to further
the interests of those residing outside its limits;
therefore, the general rule is that municipal corporations have no extra-territorial powers, but
their ;jurisdiction ends at the municipal bounda•·ies, and cannot, without specific legislative authority, extenu beyonu their geographical limits. * * ~,
As a governmental unit, the municipal corporation is the agent of the state, exercising its powers
t'or and in hehalf of the state. x ,,, * when a povver
granted to a municipal corporation cannot be
exercised without going outside the corporate
limits, the requisite authority to do so will be implied." (37 Am. Jur. p. 736, Sec. 122.)
2. "'l'he power of the legislature to authorize
a municipal corporation to acquire lands beyond
the municipal limits, and for that purpose to
exercise the power of eminent domain, cannot be
disputed. It has long been recognized to exist
where the use for which the property is taken is
a proper and reasonable public use.'' ( 3 Dillon,
Municipal Corporations, 5th Edition, 1626, Sec.
1028.}
3. '' '~ * ,x, Likewise, a municipality cannot
condemn lands within the State but outside its
own corporate limits, unless the power has been
delegated by the legislature. However, it is well
settled that the legislature may delegate such
power." ( 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
2nd Edition, 406, Sec. 1619.}
4. ''As a general rule, a municipal corporation's powers cease at municipal boundaries, and
cannot, without plain manifestation of legis1ative
intention, be exercised beyond its limits, even
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tlwugJJ it uwy lmYe ae<1nin•d prop<'riy outside its
geographieal limits. x ·x· ~· Statuh•s authoriz;ing
the exereise o[ municipal power b(~yon<l the manicipal boundarie::; are strictly construed.'' ( 43
C. J., Sec. 2.'1.3, pzJ. 235-236.)
5. ''As a general rule, a llllmiei pal corporation has no power to pnreha:·w and hold land for
a park, highway, or other municipal purpose, beyoiHl its territorial limits, unless the power has
been specially eonf<•rrpd upo11 it by the legislatun,
and s~tch power is not confcrn;rl by a general g1·ant
of pou:er to purchase, hold and convey such prozlerty, real and personal, as may be necessary fot'
its public uses and p1trposes." (Italics supplied)
( 43 C. J., Sec. 2082, p.. 1327.)
6. '"rhe authority to condemn must be expressly given or necessarily implied. The exercise
of the po·wer being against common right, it cannot be implied or inferred from vague or doubtful
language, but must be given in expn~ss terms or
by neeessary implication. \Vhen the right tu
exercise the power can only be made out by argument and inference, it does not exist. ''J'ht~re must
be no effort to prove the existence of sueh high
corporate right, else it i::; in doubt; and if so, the
State ha::; not grante<1 it.' If the Aet is silent on
the snb;ject, and the powers given by it can lk
exercised without resort to condPrrmation, it JS
presumed that the legislature intended that the
necessary property be ac<1uired hy eoHtracL * ~-· *
_,f..,. a nile, a 11/ltnir:ipal corporation cannot condi'Jitn property beyond ils limits, Hnless (Wthoril,tJ
lo do so is exzn·essly givew. ( rtaJim; s u pplie<l)
(Lewis on Erninent Dmnain, .'lrri Rdition, Sec.
871).

7. "A municipal corporation <'an not exercise
its powPrs onlside its limits, <'Xe<'lll wlH•n grantPd

IS

l<'gislative authority to do so, for all
powers and privileges conferred by the Constitution and ::;tatute::; on municipal corporations mud
he held to be limited in their exercise to the terntory emhraee<l within the municipal boundaries
and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the munieipality, unless Uw Con::;titution or statutes expressly providn that such power and privilegu ·
may JJe <'Xereised beyond tJw corporate boundaries and for the benefit of non-residents." (Sweetwater v .Hamer, 259 S. \V. ('!'ex. Civil Appeal)
191.)
t'-"PI"l\tli:\

8. "'~ '"' 'x' 'l'he city has and can have jurisdiction only within its own limits. While it is true
that poliee powers may sometimes be given for
a limited spaee around the eity limits for speeial
purposes, Yf\t they must Le specially given; and
with that exeeption, the principle is universal
illat tlw city lms no jurisdidion lJpyond its limit..;.
A ltearnod writer has said that one of the distinguishing fc~atnres of differences between the civil
law of Romp and the common law of England is
that tll<' civil law aeted personally while the comIlion law adH territorially. 'I'he civil law applied
io evNy !~oman citi;-;en, \Yherever he was, and only
a Ho!llan eiti;-;en could claim the benefit of it, even
in Rowe; while tlH~ eommon law operates on every
pn~on and thing· in thP tPrritory, and on thoHe
only. '!'he Stat<~ ean levy on a man's property
found within the State, but there is no way hy
whi<'h it <·an ti" a pn~onal liahility on !Jim ou(::;i<l<·
tlw State." (Jones v. Hines, ______ Alahmua
47 So. 7~)9, 22 L.R.A. (NS) 1098.)
9. "The general ru](• is that a muni<'ipal corporation has no power to purehase aml hold land
l"or a park or other mnni<~ipal pnrposE~s beyond
its eorporatc~ limits, nnl<'ss the pom~r has h<~<'JJ
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s rwe:ally eon J'cnect by the legisla tun~." (City
of Wichita v. Clapp, et al, 263 Pac. (Kansas) 12.)

10. "lt is equally m~ll settled law that a municipal corporation is, as a g-eneral rule, restricted
to its eorporatt~ limits in the exercise of its corpcn·ate powers." (Swit.zcr v. Harrisonbttrg, 52
S. K (Ya.) 174, 2 L. R A. (NS) 910.)
11. "All powers and privileges co11ferreu by
the Constitution and statutes on municipal corporations must be held to be limited in their
PXercise to the territory embraced in the munieipal boundaries and for the benefit of the inhabitants o,f the municipality, unless the Constitution or statute expressly provides that snell
powe'fs and privileges may be exerciseu beyond
thP corporate bounuaries or for the benefit of
non-residents.'' (Childs v. City of Columbia, 70
S.K (So. Car.) 296, 34 L.R.A. (NS) 542.)
'
12. wrhe general uoctrine is clear that such
[municipal] corporations cannot usually exercise their powers beyonu their own limits. The
right to exercise extra-territorial powers can only
arise by express grant of authority '~ * * or by
necessary implication from other powers granted." ' '' '' (Hecker v. City of LaCrosse, 40 L.R.A.
(Wis.) 829.)
13. "It is a general principle that a municipal
corporation cannot usually exercise its powers beyond its own limits, and if in any case it has
authority to do so it must be derived from some
statute which expressly or impliedly permits it
* * *. 'l'he uoctrine of ultra vires is applied with
greater strictness to municipal bodies than to
private corporations." (Fonrell v. Seattle, 86
Pac. CWash.) 217.)
14. "A municipal corporation empowerc•d 'L>
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purchase, lwlJ anJ convey any estate, real or personal, for the public use of said corporation' cannot take a conveyance of land beyond its boundaries for a puhlie highway." (Riley v. Rochester,
9 N.Y. G4.)
15. "*' * '' Unless expressly empowered by
statute, the 'J'own of Craig has no anthority tu
eondemn land outsiu(~ its corporate limits for
sewer purposes. 'J'he bare right of the 'l'own t\J
eont>truct and maintain sewen.; cannot be held ta
include tl1c right to condemn property beyond it,.;
corporate limits, in eonnPdion therewith. '" ''' "
the giving of the right to construct :-;ewers does
not also grant authoritr to subject out::-;ide lands
to operation of mnirH'nt domain. Sueh power is
not implied, lwcamw ther<:> is nothing in our statutes to even indicate, mtwh le:,;s illlply sneh pnrpose." (Macl.: o. Ton·n of Craiq, G8 Colo. 3:-l7, 191
Pac. 101.)
'l'here can he no <l<>nial of nw ::-;tatenwnt that tlw
statutes relating hoth to th(~ PXPf'cisP of the power of
t>minent domain aml to Uw authority and powen.; of tlll'
Srhool Board do not speeifically and PxprPssly authori,,e
the S(•hool Board to exerciHe tlw power of PminPnt domain
without and hPyond the mnni<'ipal limit8 of Salt Lalw
City. Under tlw authoritie8 abO\'P cited, thP pmwr in
eondPnm property beyond the botmdari<~8 of tlw mnniei
pal eorporation, exereising the right or eminPnt domain,
mnHt be PXprt)ssly givPn, and :'lll('h pow<>r is not conf<"rrPd
hy a grant of power to ]mrclmse, hold and eom'<'Y n'at
propPrt.v, or h~· tlw grant of the right ot' PmiMnt domain.
Tlw l1tah statutes quoted in full aho\'e an~ Htartlingly
silent with rPspect to the exereisP of thP powers of the
Sehool Hoard bPyond tlw honndaric•:,; of Nall LakP Cit:,.

•
Rather, these statutes, when read and considered either
separately or as a whole, compel the conclusion that the
legislatmc had no intention of granting general extraterritorial powen; to the Sehool Board. There are, however, hvo statutes enacted in 1949 that directly imply
that school hoards in Utah cannot exercise extraterritorial powers without specific authorization from the
legislature.
'1_1he first of these statutes is Section 75-11-26 Utah
Code 1943, approved March 19, 1949, which authorizes
boards of education of Utah to participate in the joint
construction or operation, or both, of a school attended
by children within tlw district and children residing in
adjoining districts, either within or outside of the State.
Undoubtedly this statute had its origin in the necessities
arising in connection with the operation of schools
located near State boundary lines. It is suggested that
the situation at ·wendover, Utah, or i"n the extreme
southwestern corner of the State in Washington County,
called for this legislative action. :B--,urthenuore, it is easy
to imagine schools being located on or near the boundary
lines between school distriets in isolated and thinly
populated areas whieh would be affected by this statute.
It will he noted that here is a grant of extraterritorial
power, and undoubtedly the statute was enacted because
of the limitation on the powers of school boards which
prohibited them from constructing or operating schools
outside of their respective districts.
The second of these statutes is Sechon 75-9-21 Utah
Code 1943, approved March 14, 1949, whieh (1) enables
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cities and :-;dwol di~triets io contract and cooperate with
one another in matters affecting the health, welfare and
<·onvenienee of the inhabitants within their respectivP
territorial limits, and (2) authorizes cities to disburse
puhli(' funds in aid of the ::;chool districts within the limits
of the respedive cities. This statute, for example,
authorizes Salt Lake City Corporation ancl a school
distrid adjacent to the boundaries of the city, to cooperate with one another in matters affecting health,
welfare and convenience of the inhabitants within their
respective territorial limits. This is a grant of extraterritorial power, both to Salt Lake City Corporation
and to the adjacent school district, with a direct inferenc·~
that without this grant of power no such power wou];l
exist. 'l'he second authoriZJation of this statute enable~-;
cities to disburse their public funds in aid of school
<listricts within the limits of the re:-;peetive cities. Here
again is a specill(' grant of power, not of an extraterritorial nature, hnt a grant of authority to nse city
l"tmds for school purpos<~s. It is therefore a grant of
spP<'ial authority of an <•xtraonlinary natun~, and <·an
WPJl lw Jikem~d to a grant OJ' extraterritorial power.

'L'he paHPni sPt h.Y ]pg·islation goYerning- hoards ol'
edueation is well <kmonstrated h~' referenep to f4Pdio:t
70-9-10 Utah Code 194:1, quoted in full ahon. '!'his
statute provides that when all the tenitory of a school
di::;trict shall lweorw~ annexed to a <~ity of thP fir::;t Ol'
second class by the e:x:lensiun of the bmmdaries of the
ciltJ, all tliP :-whool property, in<'lndinll,' money:; on hand
and <ltH• to ~neh dist ri<·l, lrlg't•tlwr \\'ith all reeonls and

papers lwlonging io such distriet, shall be transferred
to and title shall vest in the hoard of ~~dncation of suci1
city, and such board of education shall assume and b<.~
held rPsponsihle for the legitimate floating and bonded
indebtedness of such annexed district. Section 75-9-11
prescribes the method of apportioning the bonded indebtedness of such annexed district. rrhese two sections
specifically recogni11e the territorial limits of the juri,,diction of a hoard of education of a city of the fir.-::t
class, and in effect extends the jurisdiction of such
board of education over the newly annexed area of tht~
city. It is deelaratory of the principle that the juri~;
diction of the School Board is co-extensive only with
the municipal boundary lines of Salt Lake City. It is
submitted that this statute alone argues loudly in behalf
of petitioners' claim that the School Board, neither by
direct grant or implication, possesses any extraterritorial
powers, except m the specific instances above recited,
and the power of eminent domain is not within these
exceptions.

It is true that the facts of this situation are nniqm~.
The Sehool Board map corrPetly shows that there is
an area of Salt Lake County which is in effect an
"island" within the municipal limits of Salt Lake City.
It is within this county "island" that over half of
petitioners' land is situate. A great many reasons may
be suggested for the existence of this county ''island''
within the municipal boundaries of Salt Lake City, hnt
for the purposes of this case such reasons are wholly
immaterial. The fact is clear that this "island" is
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county tenitory, and not an area over which Salt Lake
City exercises jurisdiction. Pe'titioners submit that this
unique situation does not in any degree change or
mitigate the rule with respect to the exercise of extraterritorial powers by the School Board. The condemnation action seeks to take land which is within the jurisdiction of both Salt Lake County and the Granite School
District, and not within the jurisdiction of the School
Board.
\Vhen the statutes governing boards of education of
the State of Utah are eorrelated and analyzed, one
seeks in vain for a conclusion that there is any grant of
extraterritorial pmver to the School Board, except in
the case of the two 1949 statutes. These two statutes
are a departure from the gene1:al pattern set by thr~
fundamental legislation g?verning school districts, and
appear to strongly support petitioners' contention that
the School Board, in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, possesses no extraterritorial authority. If the
School Board must be specifically authorized to participate in a joint construction or operation with another
school district of the State or with a school district of
an adjoining state, it follows that it must be specifically
authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain
upon land located without the jurisdiction of the School
Board.

III.
PETITIONERS HAVE BEEN AND WILL BE SUBJECTED TO IRREMEDIAL AND IRRETRIEVABLE
CONSEQUENCES AND INJUSTICE WHICH WILL DE-
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STROY THE STATUS QUO AND RENDER AN APPEAL
FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT IN THE CONDEMNATION ACTION INEFFECTUAL TO UNDO THE MISCHIEF VISITED UPON PETITIONERS, IN THE EVENT
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD, UPON DIRECT APPEAL FROM SAID FINAL JUDGMENT, DETERMINE
THAT THE SCHOOL BOARD DOES NOT POSSESS THE
POWER AND AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT
OF EMINENT DOMAIN UPON LAND SITUATE WITHOUT THE MUNICIPAL LIMITS OF SALT LAKE CITY.

1. The petitioners <lemurn~d both g-Pnerall;, ami
speelally to the School Boanl's complaint ln thP <'ondemnation action, and also move>d the Court for nn
order requiring the School Board to make its eomplaint
more definite and eertain. By thes<' demurrers and
motion, the petitioners raised directly hefon~ the Distri<·t
Court the fluestion as to the power and authority of tlw
Sehool Board to condemn land loeated ~without and hvyond the boundaries of Salt Lake City. The Distriet
Court overruled the demurrers and denied the motion.
Further, the District Court simultaneously granted the
Sehool Board's motion for an order to enter the land
sought to be condemned for the purpose of making
examinations, surveys and maps. It was at this stage
of the condemnation action that petitioners applied to
the Supreme Court for the alternative writ of Prohibition against the District Court and the School Board.
Consideration must be given to the situation that then
confronted the petitioners:
(a) The order of the District Court made, entered
and filed on October 10, 1949, in the 'action of Board of
Edneation of Salt Lake City v. B(~rtagnoli, 0t al, Ca"''

~ o.

87,004, granting the said Board of ~ducation authorit~, to Pnter upon tlw premises sought to be condemned
for tl1P purpo~es of making examinations, surveys and
maps, is hut an intPrloeutory order, aml non-appealable.
(A t1 oniC?J General v. Pomeroy, 93 Ft. 426, 73 Pac. 2d
1277, 1289; Utah CopJJer Company v . .Montana-Bingharn
Oon:·;o/idated .Minin,rJ Co., G9 Utah 428, 255 Pac. 672-676.)
(h) In the f~Yent the District Court in the action of
Board of l'~ducation of Salt Lake City v. Bertagnoli, et al,
Casp No. 87,004, rnakPs and enter.s an order granting
said Hoard of 11Jdu<'ation authority to occupy the premises
sought to he condmnned pending said action, and to do
~mch work thereon as may he required, pursuant to
Seetion 104-61-10 Utah Code, 1943, such order will be

hut an interloeutor)T order, and not appealable. ( AttornP,if
General v. Pomeroy, supra; Utah C' op pi! r Co. v . .MontanaBingham Consolidated Mining Co., s'upra.)
(e) rl'he order of tlw Distrid Court

dat<~d

October
10, 1949, overruling petitioners' !!,'<~neral demurrer to th·~
<'omplaint of the Boanl of J<~dw~ation in tJw aetiou ni'
t h<· Board of 11:du<"ation of Salt Lake Cit~· v. BE~rtagnoli,
1'1 al, C:u..;l! ;\ll. ~~7.004, is nm1-appealahk
(Attorney
Oencml1'. PoJJI!'l'O,IJ, supra; Otah CoJJ])I'r ('o. 1' . •~1onta.na
Hinqliam Consolidat('d Mining Oo., supm; Smith v. McRrntJ, 8 Utah ;)8, 2!) Pa1·. 10:30.)
Petitioners' dPIIIntTPrs to trw complaint of the School
Board in the condemnation adion, and their motion to
reqmre the Rehool Board to makP its eomplaint mon~
<ldinit<' anil ('<'dain, with their n•sistanee to the Sehool

Board's motion for an or-der permitting it to Pllkt·
the premise>s to make <~xaminations, snrvPys and map:-:,
afforded the Distriet Court an opportunity to ru]p upon
the questions rPgarding the Distr·iet Court's jnris(lietioa
on~r the aetion and whd}wr thP ~ehool Hoard possesse1l
th<' power to condemn land situate without the nmnieipnl
limits of Halt Lake Cit~'· 'rhe petitionprs, exhansh'd
ill(';l' immediatP ]pgal rt>m<,(liPs iu the Distriet Court.

"lt is fundamental that the court or tribunal
sought to he prohibitPd must he giyen a proper
npportnnity to rule upon ohjeetions to its proceedings before the writ of prohibition will lit>.
'l'hi:::; is so evPn where the court or tribunal ha,-;
no jurisdiction." (Olson v, District Court, lOG
lTtah 220, 147 Pae. :2d 471; Fur /Jrccders' Apricultnral Coop v. Wiesley, 102 Utah 601, 132 Pac. 2d

384; State ex rel Welling v. District Court, 87
Utah 416, 49 Pac. 2d 950; Van Cott v. Turner, 88
Utah fi35, 56 Pac. 2d 16.)
'J'lwrefore the petitiom~rs fulfilled the fir:::;t requirement
for tlw issuancP of tlw alternative vnit of Prohibition.
2. The petitiOiwrs were further f,aced with the threat
expressed hy eounsd for Hw School Board in open
eourt, that on or ahont .January 1 ,1950 the Sehoul
Hoard intended to apply to the Court for an order of
oeenpmwy of' the pn•mises by the School Board under
tlw authol'it)' of SPdion 104-Gl-10 Utah Codp 194:L
'l'he uccupaney ot' tlw premises thus to he sought would
be for ilte purposL~ of eonstrueting tlw sehool building
thereon, and undoubtedly work would lw eommeneed on
the structure dming tlw pendpncy of the condemnation
action in the District Court. Such sitnation would inftiet

npon the petitionPrs Huch irretrievable l'oss 1and damage
that a

n~vcrsal

of the final judgment of the District

Court in said condemnation by the Supreme Court
\\·onld not restore petitioners to their statns quo. If
tlte School Board does not

po~>sess

the legal authority

to eorHlPnm tlw part of petitioners' land located exterior
to Hw boundaries of Ralt Lake City, the petitioners an~
undPr no <·ompnlsion to snrrender possession of the ·
s·aid part and parcel of their land to the School Board
under Section 104-Gl-10 Utah Code 1943. They are entitled to the possession of their land, and they are entitled to their land as va<~ant land. The fact that the
School Board may placr~ a struetun~ thereon which would
be a loss to tht> Ndwol Board, should it finally b<~ lwld
that it had no auilwrit.v to ae<tnin~ ih<~ land, wonld not
lw plaeiug the pditioners in I hP position Uwy O<~<·npied
prior to tlw institution of tlw eon<hmmation aetion. rrheir
fun<lanH·ntal right of PxeluHive possPssion ol' tlwir !awl
in its tlt<'ll eondiiion would ltavP lwen violated, and n•siii uti on to th<•nt in form of damages, or evt>n by the aequisitiolt ol' H partially OJ' wholly <'Olllplete<l sd100l strudure
on ihP laud would uot h~ave ih<·nl in the ~>am(~ positio~1
they 1voulu haVl~ oeeupied had possession of their land
110t bl'Pll \\T<'sf<•d from tlwm. rl'h<•y W<'l'<' ('Ollfl'OIItl~d with
a partieularly <·ritieal ~ituation aft<~r tlw a<lvnrsn rtdingl'\
of' the Distrid Court, mHl tlH·y w<·n~ not eompPllP<l to
await thP out<'Oill(~ of' Uw ('01Hlenmation adion hdoru
t<~sting tlw authority of' the Nehool I3oanl in the SnprPIIH'
( \mrt. rf'}w irretriuvabln damag<~ which \\'Ollld 1)(• Hlfli<'f<•d upon tiH~m h,\· Uwir loss ol' possnssion of' th<'

land and use then•of hy the 8ehool Board presc·n ied a
faetnal situation whid1 auihoril'.erl th<>m inlm<>diatPly t')
appl)' to the Supr<>me Court for an aH<~mative writ of
Prohihi tion, to the und that the SC'hool Boanl 's authority
could be determine(] forthwith.
'!'liP relief whieh :l
rPp;ular app<>al from the eond<~nmation judgment wonld
afford wonl<l he wholly inad<>qnai<~, nndPr the eireumstances.

J lad the pditimwrs r<>mained passivr~ al'ter thP
rulings of the Distriet Court, and allowPd the 8chool
Board to enter upon the premise::; and con::;truct valnahll'
improvements thereon, thPy would prohahl)' have bePn
;mhjeded to the charge of acquieseing in thC' action of
the School Board. By their allowing the 8rhool Board
to proeeed with eonstruetio11 of a building and the
expenditure of a large ::;um of money thereon, they migh~
also lw e>stopped from asse>rting that the School Board
had no authority to rondPmn land without the municip'll
houndarie>s of Salt Lah City. In view of these perils,
it was ineumhent upon the petitimwrs to take immediate
lPgal aetion not only to protPet tlwir own right, but
also to forewarn the School Board that petitioner!'l
were contesting its authority to eomh•rnn the part of
their land located outside of the munic•ipal bonndarie"
of Salt Lake City.
rl'lw .authoritie>s her0inafter cited sustain the issuanc2
of tlw \Vrit under the>s<' eonditions:
"What can be said is that ordinarily the superior court \vill look only to sn<> if the lower
emut was nding without or i11 PX<'<'ss of ;jnrisdic•
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tion, and ir so, whether there is still not some
adequate and spPedy remedy, but that in certain
situations when) it would work a palpable injustice or hardship or cause damage which could
not he checked or remedied in any other way, the
superior court will not go too refinedly into the
question as to what constitutes error merely, or
lade or excess of jurisdiction, before issuing the
\\'rit." (Atwoor/1•. Oo:x:, 88 Utah 42fi, :55, Pac. 2d

:r/7

at :ms.)
.1\'oTI!t Point Consolidated In. Co. v. Utah

and Salt Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155,
4G Pac. 824.

Olson u. The District CotlTt, supra.
Hrnadbent v. Gibson, 105 TJtr.h 5:1, J40 Pac.
:Zd 939.
Me,IJCrs u. 11ronson .• 100 Utah 279, 114 Pac. 2d
21iL

A dolph Coors Co. v. Liq1wr Control Commis·'·ion, 99 Utah 246, 105 Pae. 2d 181.
Allen v. Di:nbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 Pac. 2d 220.
People u. Sj;ie1's, 4 Utah 3R5, 10 Pac. 601, Jl
Pac. 509.
Cf. Home Owners' Loan Co1poration v. Lor;an Cit.11, 97 Utah 235, 92 Pac. 2d 346.
rrherefore tht) second condition for the issuance of the
"rrit of Prohibition is Jnt)t in this case.

IV.
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER A BOARD OF EDUCATION POSSESSES POWER TO ACQUIRE LAND
SITUATE WITHOUT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE DISTRICT BY EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN PRESENTS AN ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF UTAH,

:n

AND ON THIS BASIS A WRIT OF PROHIBITION
SHOULD ISSUE.

InvohTed in thi8 action is a question of broad puhlin
concPrn, and that is \Ylwther or not the hoards of education of this state ean, through tlw use of the power of
rminPnt domain, go without their respective district;-;
and aequin' land. As indicated in this brief, the pattern
ot' lt>gi:-dation of this state has been to confine the jurisdiction and powers of the hoards of education to their
respective districh;. A decision that would uphold the
School Board in the instant case would represent a
deviation from thiH pattern, which might have farreaching effect, particularly within the populated areas
of the state. lt can vn~ll hf~ imagined that a segmem
of the population living within the municipal boundaries
of Salt Lake City might he more conveniently sPrved
if the School Board lueated one of its new buildings
without the city limit~ and wthiu the limits of Granite
School District. [l' eo!l(litions exist that reqnire the
School Board to build structures and operate schooL;
without the municipal limits ol· Salt Lakr City, it is
res:peetfnlly suggested that legislative relief should bt~
sought rather than attempting to acquire property
agaim;t the wishes of its owners by means of the judicial process, when the authority for such action is oper1
to most serious question. 'rhe public interest in this
ease is direct. It is notorious that in certain areas of
Salt Lake City there is a pressing demand for moru
school buildings. If the petitioners are wrong in their
contentions herein made, they should be so informed
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imme<liately, so that the School Board can proceed
forthwith in the construction of the necessary school
lmilding. On the other hand, if petitioners are correct
in their n~sistance to the School Board's action, they
are entitled to an immediate protection of the courts.
']'his situation i.-; well within the spirit and intention
of tlw SuprPnw Court when it wrote:
'"Perhaps the court i~ not entirely without
.-;ome di:,;eretion in determining whether or not
another adequate remedy exists. 'Discretion'
does not mean happy or fortuitous choice, but a
diseretion guided by cireurnstances surrounding
the litigation. If the term 'adequate remedy'
were an absolute, it might be ineorrect to say that
we could ever grant the writ where there was another adequate rPmedy. But 'adequate remedy'
is a matter of degree and may nm the gamut of
situations at one end where not to grant the writ
would leave the petitioner where he could not
retrieve hhnself. (Atwood v. Cox) to situations
on the other hand vvhere not to grant the writ
would leave the pf'titioner where there were no
factors of hardship other than those which attend
the ordinary judgment and appeal. In between,
situation:,; may arise where, in the single case at
bar, tht-re appears to be a remedy adequate in
the ordinary course of the law, but where there
are urgent public questions or questions of public
policy involved directly or indirectly related or
dependent upon the outcome, or where the urgent
rights of a large group of the puhlie await tlw
resolution of the question, or where a multiplicity
of suits threaten, or where some facton;, either
intrinsie or <'xtrinsic to the litigation, reveal thP
ordinary course of the law really not to be ad\)quatP although on the face of things it may
33

tP('hnieally appuar to hc>. ln those ('a:,.;(•s Ult' \\'rit
may issue in the sound diserdion of th(• court.
l\~rhaps another wa~· of ~'.tating the propositimt
would be to say that suC'h eirenmstanees inn>lvo
a eontradiction and adually dd<:~at tho adequacy
of tho remedy at law-render it not :;;o. In the last
analysis, adequacy of legal remudy may he unde'c·
eertain circumstanct~s a matter for reasonable
tlifferew·es of opinion. Tn sueh cases if judgment
prevailed for is:;;uing the writ over judgment
against issuing it, it could he said to have issued
in the sound discretion of the court, eveu though
other minds might have reasonably coneluded that
the legal remedy was adequate. Bnt 'sound discretion' must always he labell~~d with the precautionary admonition that the writ is for extraord!nary occasions and should he sparingly used.''
(Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, at p. 942 of 140
Pac. 2d.)
Cl'.

~Vashinglo11 (.'o1mf1J 1'. Stale Ta:x: Com,.
missiou, 10:J l Ttal1 7:l, l:l:l Pae. 2d 5fi4.

WJH~I~EF0l{l1~,

pditimwn; respedfull:· surnhit ihnt
the DistJ·iet 'Comt and the :-:;chool Board should lw
pPI'llHUH~ntly Jn·ohibitPd and rPstrained from prosecution
of tlw condemnation adion.
Rl'l'J~R,

COWAN, llKt\TUOI)
& l<'INLINRON
Attorneys for Petitioners
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